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Usury Statutes—Their Effect on Deferred Payments of Installment
Sales Contracts.—Langille v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank of Philadelphia?
—Plaintiffs, conditional vendees, sought to discharge a bond and mortgage
given as security for a conditional sales contract covering materials used
in the erection of a pre-fabricated home. Pursuant to an agreement between
the vendor and a finance company, the plaintiffs executed the bond and
mortgage to the company and the latter subsequently assigned them to the
defendant as security for a loan. The plaintiffs argued that the transaction
involving the bond and mortgage was an usurious loan made by the finance
company to the plaintiffs and was in violation of the usury statutes of
Pennsylvania? In resolving the question as to whether the time price
differential (difference between cash and credit prices) was to be considered
interest or an addition to the seller's margin of profit, the Chancellor sus-
tained defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the time
price differentials of credit sales do not come within the purview of the
usury statutes because the legislature never intended that they should.
In rendering judgment for the defendant the Chancellor approved
the historical reasons for excepting credit transactions from the prohibition
against usury. 3 His decision is in accord with the majority view prevalent in
the United States today and with the traditional view on the subject that a
time price differential in a conditional sale is not interest as that term
is used in most usury statutes.4
 Under this view, if a man needs an auto-
mobile for his business, borrows the money from a loan agency and then
pays cash to the dealer he is protected by the interest limitations of the
usury statutes; but if he chooses to finance through the dealer and buys
the car on time, his note may be subsequently discounted by the same loan
agency with which he preferred not to deal but he would not be protected
by the statutory interest limitations. Considering the large number of credit
transactions and the pressures exerted on unwary buyers to finance directly
with the conditional vendor any view giving such a result must be narrowly
construed' In the last decade a strong minority has become discernible.
The leading case representative of this view is Hare v. General Contract
1 153 A.2d 211 (Del. Ch. 1959).
2 Act of May 28, 1858, P.L. 622 sec. 1; Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, § 3
(1954) ". . . the lawful rate of interest for the loan or use of money in all cases
where no express contract shall have been made for a less rate, shall be 6% per
annum . . ."
8 153 A.2d 211, 213 (Del. Ch. 1959).
4 Newkirk v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 93 Ga. App. 1, 90 S.E.2d 618 (1955);
General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Propst, 239 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951);
Thomas v. Knickerbocker Operating Co., 202 Misc. 286, 108 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct.
1951); Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53; Luchesi v.
Capitol Loan and Finance Co., 83 R.I. 151, 113 A.2d 725 (1955) ; Brown v. Crandall,
218 S.C. 124, 61 S.E.2d 761 (1950).
5 For a discussion on the similarity between a conditional sale and a loan
see "The Installment Contract and the Usury Laws—A Plea for a More Realistic
Judicial Approach," 18 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 648; Berger, Usury in Installment Sales, 2 Law
Contemp. Prob. 148 (1935).
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CASE NOTES
Purchase Carpe wherein the court in finding for the defendant finance
company issued a caveat that it was overruling its past decisions and now
takes the position that where the vendor has increased the cash price in
anticipation of discounting the note to a finance company, the transaction
is to be regarded as a loan and usurious if the time price differential exceeds
the lawful rate of interest. A recent decision 7 finding a violation of the
usury laws did so on the so called bona-fide time price doctrine which
distinguishes between a credit price unrelated to a cash price and one
arrived at by adding excessive interest rates to a basic cash price, the former
being regarded as nonusurious, whereas the latter is violative of the usury
statutes. The court also gave emphasis to the fact that the financing bank
furnished the sales forms, made the computations for the final price and
had direct dealings with the vendee.
In light of the above two cases it is difficult to sustain the position
taken by the court in the present case. Not only did the vendor make
the sale with reasonable assurance that he could discount the note to the
finance company, but also the vendee in executing the instruments° dealt
directly with the finance company, consummation of the sale depending on
its acceptance of the vendee's application for deferred payment purchase.
In all the cases cited by the Chancellor in the opinion the original transaction
involved a conditional sale between vendor and purchaser with the paper
subsequently being discounted by a finance company .° In the few cases
in which there have been direct dealings between the purchaser and the
finance company the courts have disregarded 'form, and even though the
transaction has been in the nature of a conditional sales contract these
courts have held it to be usurious where the charges have been excessive.°
Decisions have also pointed out the distinction between credit and loan
transactions holding the statutes applicable when the latter were present."
If the result in the instant case is followed to its logical conclusion the
indirect approach previously required of finance companies seeking to
avoid the usury statutes may be done away with and usurious interest rates
may in effect be obtained even in direct purchaser-finance company dealings
provided the form of a conditional sales contract is used. Furthermore
even if the facts demonstrate that a loan is involved the applicability of
the usury statutes is no longer assured. Thus the two most relied upon
6 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
1 Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); rehearing denied 228
F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1956).
8 The court mentions a mortgage but does not specify the type of mortgage
it was, nor does it characterize the property on which the mortgage was given.
9 Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39 (1926); Dunn v.
Midland Loan Finance Corp., 206 Minn. 550, 289 N.W. 411 (1939).
to Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 7; Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp.,
90 Ga. App. 352, 83 S.E.2d 76 (1954); Nazarian v. Lincoln Finance Corp., 77 R.I. 497,
78 A.2d 7 (1951).
11 General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Propst, supra note 4; G.M.A.C. v. Weinrich,
218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425 (1924).
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defenses of the conditional vendee have been destroyed. The result leaves
unprotected the consumer, who in light of present day commercial transactions
requires credit to survive. Considering the magnitude of credit sales in
automobile purchasing alone," this result is both naive and impractical,
and is an unwarranted broadening of a judicial policy formulated when
installment buying was practically unheard of."
AARON K. BIKOFSKY
12
 In 1956, 63% of all new cars and 58% of all used cars were sold on credit.
43 Fed. Reserve Bull. 643 (1957).
/ 3 The earliest case on the problem held a sale of a plantation at a greater price
for credit than for cash was not usury even though the difference in price was more
than the rate of interest allowed by the usury statute. Beete v. Bidgood, 7 B. & C. 453,
108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827).
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